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Abstract
The DRM method has proved to be a popular and powerful, if controversial, way to study ‘false memories’. One reason for
the controversy is that the extent to which the DRM effect generalises to other kinds of memory error has been neither
satisfactorily established nor subject to much empirical attention. In the present paper we contribute data to this ongoing
debate. One hundred and twenty participants took part in a standard misinformation effect experiment, in which they
watched some CCTV footage, were exposed to misleading post-event information about events depicted in the footage,
and then completed free recall and recognition tests. Participants also completed a DRM test as an ostensibly unrelated filler
task. Despite obtaining robust misinformation and DRM effects, there were no correlations between a broad range of
misinformation and DRM effect measures (mean r =2.01). This was not due to reliability issues with our measures or a lack
of power. Thus DRM ‘false memories’ and misinformation effect ‘false memories’ do not appear to be equivalent.
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Introduction
Driven by the controversy surrounding cases of adults who have
reported recovering memories of childhood sexual abuse for which
they claim to have been previously unaware, a large body of
literature has focussed on variables that influence how such claims
arise [1]. One important line of work has focused on individual
differences and has shown that, for example, people who score
higher on measures of dissociative experiences [2], [3], or who are
fantasy prone [4] are more susceptible to certain kinds of memory
errors. The present paper continues this focus on individual
differences and examines whether individuals who endorse
misinformation are also more susceptible to semantic intrusions
in the DRM (Deese-Roediger-McDermott) task [5].
In the DRM task participants are presented with lists of
semantically associated words (e.g., bed, rest, awake). In subse-
quent free recall and recognition tests, participants often
erroneously recall and recognise non-presented critical lures (e.g.,
sleep) as having been presented as part of the earlier lists. The
DRM effect is robust, and elicits errors that are stable over time
[6]. Whilst some researchers argue that errors in the DRM task
might be equivalent to, or at least diagnostic of, memory errors in
general [6], [7], others are not convinced [8-10] (but see [11],
[12]).
For example, some researchers argue that ‘‘it has not been
demonstrated that the mechanisms that operate to explain the
DRM findings apply as well to memory for planting entirely new
events in memory, specifically memory for child sexual abuse’’ (p.
9) [8]. Others disagree, arguing that there is ‘‘not enough evidence
to confidently state that different mechanisms underlie different
memory illusions’’ (p. 23) [12]. Whilst DRM errors need not be
equivalent to memory errors in other contexts in order to be
diagnostic of them [7], and the underlying processes driving DRM
and autobiographical memory errors may be different, both can
be conceptualised as a form of monitoring failure [6]. Yet the
findings to date concerning possible relationships between DRM
errors and other memory errors have been mixed.
On one hand, research using memory errors that occur outside
of the psychological laboratory has shown that people reporting
memories of ‘past lives’ [7] or abduction by space aliens [13] make
more DRM errors, than people who do not report such memories
– although this has not been found consistently [14]. On the other
hand, research using laboratory-induced autobiographical mem-
ory errors has not found any such link. In one experiment DRM
errors made by adults were unrelated to erroneous remember/
know judgments in an autobiographical memory task [3]. Whilst
some aspects of DRM task performance (i.e., adopting a liberal
response bias) have been shown to predict false memories of
childhood events in adults, the false recognition of critical lures
(DRM errors) has not [15]. In child participants, no relationship
has been found between DRM errors and false memories for
either details of a witnessed event, or for entire autobiographical
events, although this might be due to age-related changes in
children’s susceptibility to DRM errors [16–20].
In the current paper, we present data that contribute to this
ongoing debate. Specifically, we wanted to know whether DRM
errors in adults were associated with, or diagnostic of, the
misinformation effect – errors that arise as a result of exposure
to misleading post-event information (hereafter PEI; see [21], [22] for
overviews). To our knowledge, no published studies have explored
the relationship between the two. In our experiment participants
received misleading PEI about items from a real-life event. The
key focus of the analysis we present here is whether the
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endorsement of misleading PEI was related in any meaningful way
to memory performance in a DRM task.
Misinformation effects come in two main varieties – either
impaired memory for original events, or endorsement of
misinformation as being part of the original event [23], [24].
Logically, DRM errors should be more closely related to the latter
than the former because, in the DRM method, the lures are not
part of the original lists, thus there is no original memory to be
impaired. Also both DRM errors and misinformation endorse-
ment have been conceptualised as ‘false memory’ effects – that is,
they involve the ‘‘recollection of something that did not happen’’
(p. 835) [6]. In the present paper we focus on misinformation
endorsement because, if there is any association between the
DRM errors and misinformation effects, this is where it should be
found.
That said it is not even clear whether there should be a
relationship because different conclusions would follow from
alternative theories of misinformation endorsement. If the
misinformation effect is due to the acceptance of misleading
information [25] then we should expect no relationship with
DRM errors because, typically, the DRM method does not
include a social influence component. This leaves a second major
explanation – source monitoring failure – as the only credible
driver of any relationship between DRM errors and misinforma-
tion endorsement. Theoretically both errors reflect failures to
monitor the source of remembered items [26]. A DRM error
occurs when a lure is misremembered as being presented in the
original word list and the misinformation effect occurs when
misleading PEI is incorrectly attributed to the original event.
In the present study we took DRM free recall and recognition
measures, and also calculated signal detection indices of sensitivity
and response bias. The latter analyses were included to explore
whether DRM errors and misinformation endorsement might
indeed be related at the source monitoring level [6], [15]. Put
another way, are participants who are less able to discriminate new
from old DRM items, or who adopt a liberal response bias towards
new items, more likely to endorse misleading PEI as being part of
the original witnessed event?
Methods
These data were collected as part of a larger experiment on
whether the strength, rather than the source, of misleading
information is a key determinant of the misinformation effect. Full
details of the design and procedure for that experiment are
available from the authors and only the information relevant to the
present study is presented here.
Ethics statement
The experimental protocol was reviewed and approved by the
Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee, University of
Portsmouth, UK. Participants provided full written consent prior
to taking part in the experiment and were fully debriefed upon
completion.
Design and participants
One hundred and twenty University of Portsmouth undergrad-
uates (mostly psychology students; 90 female; median age
= 19 years; range = 18 to 42 years) participated in exchange for
course credits or £5. A 2 (influence type: direct vs. indirect) 62
(post-warning: yes vs. no) experimental design was used for the
main experiment, with participants randomly allocated to each
cell. Exposure to misleading details (vs. no exposure) and delay
(immediate vs. one week) were manipulated within subjects.
Materials
Event. Participants watched a 2 min clip of CCTV (Closed
Circuit Television) footage [27], showing an armed robbery of a
jewellery store by four young males. In the clip, which has no
sound, two men enter the store and pretend to look around. One
of them then jumps over the counter and is out of view for a while,
before returning. Meanwhile, two further perpetrators enter the
store and one of them attempts to smash the glass cabinets.
Eventually all perpetrators leave, some of them carrying bags. Two
of the perpetrators are seen carrying guns, but no violence or theft
is visible in the footage. This CCTV clip was pre-tested to select
critical items. Six items of medium memorability (30–80% correct;
to avoid floor or ceiling effects; and see [28]) were selected to serve
as critical items for the main study; the remaining 12 items were
used as filler items in the recognition memory test (see below). The
use of these items as misled vs. control items was counterbalanced
across participants; half of the participants received misleading
PEI for three of the critical items and no PEI for the other three,
and vice versa for the other half of the participants.
Introduction of PEI. The misleading PEI was provided, in
the indirect influence condition, through a 230 word long written
statement (described as being that of another witness) and, in the
direct influence condition, through matching scripted and re-
hearsed sentences that were inserted in a post-event discussion by a
confederate.
DRM lists. Five word lists were used (from [29]; Table 1A).
Each list consists of 15 words (e.g., bed, rest, awake) that are all
semantically associated to one non-presented word (i.e., the lure,
e.g., sleep). The specific word lists used in the present experiment
were the ones related to the following critical lures: rough; doctor;
smell; sleep; and chair (the full list of semantic associates can be
found in the appendix of [29]). Each list was presented on a
computer screen following an initial fixation point. Each word
appeared on screen for 1s, followed by a blank screen for 1 s. After
presentation of each list participants were asked to write down all
the words they could remember in a booklet. The DRM
procedure used here was based on other published work [3].
DRM recognition test. The 30-word recognition test con-
sisted of 15 old items (the words in the first, eighth and tenth
positions of each list), the five lures, and ten unrelated new items
taken randomly from published DRM lists [29]. Participants were
asked to indicate whether they remembered each word (by circling
Yes or No).
Procedure
All participants were tested individually in an experimental
cubicle (except for the discussion phase of the direct influence
condition). In the first session, they began by watching the CCTV
footage on a laptop screen and then completed the first part of the
DRM procedure (list presentation and free recall) which was
presented as an unrelated filler task. Thereafter, participants
received instructions for the next phase of the experiment, in
which misinformation was introduced either directly or indirectly.
After the misinformation introduction phase, all participants
completed the second part of the DRM procedure (the recognition
test) for another five minutes. Finally they were given 10 min to
complete a free recall test followed immediately by a second
memory test (the same 18-item four-alternative forced-choice
recognition test used in the pre-test). After one week, participants
returned for a second session, at the beginning of which half of
them received a medium-strength warning, provided orally by the
experimenter. Participants in the no-warning condition were
merely asked to think briefly about their last session. All
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participants then completed the same free recall and recognition
tests that were used in the first session.
Coding
DRM Free recall. The mean number of correctly recalled old
items (studied words), falsely recalled lures, and intrusions were
created by averaging the number of recalled words per category
across the five lists.
DRM recognition and signal detection measures. The
number of old, lure and new items that participants recognised was
summed and converted to proportions. Two sets of non-
parametric signal detection indices of sensitivity (A9) and response
bias (B99d) were then computed [30]. The first set compared hits to
old words to false recognition of lures (henceforth lure A9 and lure
B99d), and the second set compared hits to old words to false
recognition of new words (henceforth new A9 and new B99d). Values
of A9 range from 0 (no discrimination) to 1 (perfect discrimination)
and values of B99d range from 21 (liberal bias) to +1 (conservative
bias). For each participant two sets of difference scores were then
computed by subtracting the lure scores from the new scores. The
A9 difference score thus ranged from 21 to +1. A positive (negative)
score indicated that the participant was poorer (better) at
discriminating lures than at discriminating new items. The B99d
difference score ranged from 22 to +2. A negative (positive) score
indicated a tendency to have a more conservative bias (more
liberal bias) for lures than for new items.
Endorsement of misleading PEI. Firstly, the number of
control (0–3) and experimental (0–3) items that were answered
using PEI was summed. From these, individual misinformation
effect scores were calculated by subtracting the experimental
scores from the control scores such that a positive score indicated
the presence of a misinformation effect. Four sets of these scores
were calculated resulting from the combination of free recall and
recognition measures at immediate and 1-week delayed testing.
Results
The first steps were to determine whether we had obtained (1) a
DRM ‘false memory’ effect and (2) a misinformation effect (the
means and standard errors are shown in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively).
Memory performance in the DRM task
Free recall. The mean number of words recalled (old, lures &
intrusions) was entered into a one-way within-subjects Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA). There was a significant main effect of recall
type, F2,238 = 3601.17, p,.001, partial g
2 = .97. Post-hoc analyses
(LSD) revealed that participants freely recalled significantly more
old words than lures and intrusions, and significantly more lures than
intrusions (all ps,.001).
Recognition memory. Participants correctly recognised
85% of the old words, and falsely recognised 68% of the lures
and 3% of the new items. The proportion of words recognised (old,
lure, new) was entered into a one-way within-subjects ANOVA.
There was a significant main effect of recognition type, F2,238
= 621.13, p,.001, partial g2 = .84. Post-hoc analyses (LSD)
revealed that the proportion of old word recognition was
significantly higher than both the proportion of lure and new word
recognition (all ps,.001). The proportion of lure recognition was
significantly higher than the proportion of new word recognition (a
DRM ‘false memory’ effect, p,.001). A paired samples t-test
conducted on the A9 scores indicated that participants were
significantly able to discriminate new (from old) words on the
recognition test better than lures, t119 = 17.73, p,.001. Inspection
of the A9 difference scores confirmed this pattern. Similar analyses on
the B99d scores indicated that participants adopted a significantly
more liberal response criterion in respect to lures than to new words,
t119 = 19.60, p,.001. This pattern was also confirmed by the B99d
difference scores.
Misinformation endorsement
Initial inspection of the data revealed that the endorsement of
misleading PEI was not affected by either the ‘medium strength’
warning or the effects of a one-week delay, therefore further
analyses were collapsed across those conditions. A 2 (type of
memory: recognition; recall)62 (source of misleading PEI: direct;
indirect) mixed ANOVA revealed that misleading PEI exerted a
significantly stronger effect on recognition memory than on recall
memory, F1,118 = 15.87, p,.001, partial g2= .11, and had
significantly less impact when introduced via a confederate than
via a written statement, F1,118 = 4.92, p= .028, partial g2= .04.
The type of memory x source of misleading PEI interaction was
not significant (F,.01).
Further analyses were conducted to explore the variables of core
interest in more detail. Starting with the free recall data, the mean
misinformation effect score was 0.30 (SE=0.06; range 21.50 to
+2.50) and was normally distributed (skew =0.10, SE=0.22;
kurtosis =20.20, SE =0.44). The mean was also significantly
different from zero, t(119) = 4.71, p,.001, showing a misinfor-
mation effect. Moving on to the recognition data, the mean
misinformation effect score was 0.62 (SE =0.08; range 21.50 to
+3.00) and was normally distributed (skew =20.17, SE =0.22;
kurtosis =0.35, SE =0.44). Again, there was a misinformation
effect, t(119) = 7.37, p,.001.
Table 1.Mean (SE) free recall of old, lure and new DRM items and proportion recognition of old, lure and new DRM items with SDT
indices.
DRM
Free recall Mean Old Mean Lure Mean Intrusion
9.36 (0.13) 0.46 (0.02) 0.27 (0.03)
Recognition Prop Old Prop Lure Lure A9 Lure B99d Prop New New A9 New B99d A9 diff B99d diff
.85 (.01) .68 (.03) .62(.02) 2.23 (.02) .03 (.01) .93 (.01) .29 (.03) .30 (.02) .52 (.03)
Note: The free recall of non-old or non-lure items is referred to as an intrusion to distinguish it from the new items contained in the recognition phase.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057939.t001
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Was the misinformation effect related to the DRM
measures?
In summary, participants responded as expected and we
obtained the typical DRM ‘false memory’ effect, as well as typical
and robust misinformation effects. Now we turn to the crucial part
of the analysis. Recall that our primary research question
concerned relationships between the magnitude of the misinfor-
mation effect(s) in free recall and recognition on one hand, and
memory performance and monitoring in the DRM task on the
other. Pearson’s correlation coefficients were computed between
the misinformation effect variables (free recall, recognition, and
also an overall measure which resulted from averaging the recall
and recognition misinformation effects) and the measures derived
from the DRM free recall (lures, intrusions) and recognition (lures,
new, lure A9, lure B99d, new A9, new B99d, A9 diff and B99d diff scores)
tests. As shown in Table 3, none of these correlations were
significant. The strongest correlation (r =2.10, p= .24) was with
the overall misinformation effect and the false recognition of new
items on the DRM test, and was opposite to the theoretically
expected direction. The mean of the 30 misinformation effect-
DRM correlations (highlighted in bold in Table 3) was r =2.01.
As misleading PEI had a stronger effect when introduced via a
written statement than via a confederate, the data file was split on
this variable and the coefficients calculated again. Again, none of
these correlations were significant. The mean of the 30 misinfor-
mation effect-DRM correlations was r = 2.01 for both the
written and confederate conditions.
There are two potential problems associated with any reported
lack of correlation between two variables. Firstly, lack of
correlation can be a consequence of unreliable measurement of
the two variables; any observed correlation would be attenuated
(potentially to the degree that a true underlying correlation is
completely obscured) if the measurement reliability of any of the
two variables (or both) approaches zero. To address this issue, we
checked the reliabilities of our misinformation effect and DRM
variables. It was not possible to calculate internal consistencies for
New A9 and New B99d measures because the new items on the
recognition test were not list – specific. As a consequence it was
also not possible to calculate meaningful internal consistencies for
the A9 diff and B99d diff measures as these are calculated using the
New scores. Nevertheless, we obtained the internal consistencies of
the remaining six DRM variables shown in Table 3 (items 4 to 13)
by treating each list (i.e., sleep, smell, rough, chair & doctor) as an
item within a five-item ‘DRM scale’ pertaining to the respective
scores (e.g., DRM recall lures, Prop lure, etc.) and calculated the
Cronbach’s alphas of these five-item scales in our sample of 120
participants. The obtained alphas ranged from .39 to .65 (mean
alpha = .54).
It was not possible to calculate the internal consistencies of the
misinformation effect variables in the same way, because – due to
within-participants manipulation and counterbalancing – different
items had been used to measure control and misled memory
performance (and hence the misinformation effect). Instead, we
determined the test-retest reliabilities of the misinformation effect
variables by correlating the respective immediate and 1-week
Table 2. Misinformation effects (SE) in free recall and recognition tests as a function of the source of misleading PEI.
Free recall misinformation effect Recognition misinformation effect Recall and recognition combined
Source of misleading PEI
Written .45 (.09) .75 (.11) .60 (.09)
Confederate .16 (.09) .47 (.11) .32 (.09)
Groups combined .30 (.06) .61 (.08)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057939.t002
Table 3. Pearson’s r correlations between misinformation effect measures and DRM memory performance measures.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1. Overall misinfo effect .83*** .90*** 2.03 2.04 2.03 2.10 2.01 2.03 .02 .05 .02 .04
2. Misinfo effect 2 Recall .49*** 2.03 2.01 .02 2.10 2.02 .09 .04 .06 .04 2.00
3. Misinfo effect – Recog 2.02 2.05 2.04 2.08 .00 2.02 2.00 .04 .00 .06
4. DRM recall lures .40*** .56*** 2.00 2.59*** .07 2.06 .13 .60*** .09
5. DRM recall intrusions .17 .11 2.23* .04 2.12 2.04 .21* 2.08
6. Prop lure .01 2.83*** 2.11 .14 2.07 .88*** 2.00
7. Prop new .01 2.06 2.54*** 2.54*** 2.13 2.69***
8. Lure A9 2.17* .25** 2.29** 2.98*** 2.20*
9. Lure B99d 2.50*** .52
*** .07 2.17
10. New A9 2.26** 2.05 .09
11. New B99d .24
** .75***
12. A9 diff .22*
13. B99d diff
Notes: N = 120; * p,.05, **p,.01, ***p,.005. Correlations of interest in bold font.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057939.t003
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delayed scores. This yielded test-retest correlations ranging from r
= .49 to r= .63 (mean r= .57). Moreover, because the test-retest
reliabilities might have been affected by the (albeit rather weak; see
above) effect of the warning, we repeated these calculations for the
non-warning participants only and found similar values (range: r
= .52 to r= .66; mean r= .58).
While these reliabilities are not perfect, they are good enough to
render a measurement unreliability argument implausible. Ac-
cording to the usual attenuation formula [31] and using the mean
reliabilities reported above, any true underlying correlation would
have been reduced to 50–60% of its original magnitude – still
strong enough to be detected if it really existed. This leads us to the
second potential problem with absent correlation, lack of power.
According to standard post-hoc power correlations [32], our study
had a power of .95 to statistically detect a manifest positive
correlation of r = .29, and an even smaller manifest correlation of
r = .23 would have been detected with a still respectable power of
.80. Finally, keep in mind that the average obtained correlation
was almost exactly zero, that is, there was not even a tendency in
the direction of a positive correlation that might not have been
detected for unreliability or power reasons. Hence, summing up all
these considerations, our finding of essentially zero correlations
between DRM and misinformation effect measures cannot be
attributed to measurement unreliability or a lack of power.
Discussion
The aim of the current experiment was to establish whether any
aspect of DRM memory performance was related to the
endorsement of misleading PEI. Despite obtaining robust and
powerful DRM and misinformation effects, none of the measures
were significantly related (and this lack of relation was not due to
measurement unreliability or lack of power). This was true at the
level of participants’ overt responses (i.e., number of DRM items
falsely recalled and/or recognised), as well as at the level of
sensitivity and response bias. Recall that previous work on the
relationship between DRM memory performance and memory
errors has produced mixed findings. Some research shows that
participants who recounted false autobiographical memories of
abduction by space aliens [13] and of past lives [7] also reported
more DRM lures. In our data however we found no relationship
between memory errors and the recall or recognition of DRM
lures, in line with the work on laboratory-induced memory errors
[3], [15], [16].
The variation in findings may be due, in part, to differences in
the samples, and the specific memory errors under investigation.
Memory distortions can be classified into two distinct categories
[33]. The first category is ‘naturally occurring’ errors that are
essentially by-products of normal associative and reconstructive
memory processes (like DRM errors). The second category is
‘suggestion-dependent’ errors that occur after participants have
been deliberately exposed to misleading post-event misinformation
(as in the ‘misinformation effect’). Another system [34] classifies
memory errors into three categories: schema-based reconstruc-
tions (into which DRM errors would fit); source monitoring
failures (into which the misinformation effect would fit); and an
‘‘other’’ category (into which autobiographical memory errors like
alien abduction experiences would fit). Thus one account of the
current findings is that reporting DRM lures and reporting
misleading PEI are indeed simply different ‘kinds’ of memory error
that rely on different underlying mechanisms. These are the first
data we are aware of that speak directly to this issue, however.
Despite these differences, there are also enough similarities that
would, in principle, lead one to expect that there might be some
kind of common underlying mechanism. Although DRM intru-
sions can be classified as schema-based errors and the misinfor-
mation effect as source monitoring errors [34], both types of errors
could also legitimately be seen as source monitoring failures [6]. In
the DRM method, lures are falsely recalled as being part of the
original word list and, according to the source monitoring account
of misinformation endorsement, such errors occur because
participants incorrectly remember the misleading PEI as being
part of the original event. Our calculation and analysis of signal
detection indices (A9) indicated that, as expected, participants were
less sensitive to the lures than they were to new items on the DRM
recognition test. However, there was no correlation between this
measure of sensitivity and the extent to which participants relied
on misleading PEI in the free recall or recognition tests. It was also
not the case that participants who adopted a more liberal criterion
for reporting a lure, or new, item as old (B99d) were more likely to
endorse misleading PEI. If DRM errors can be characterised as
resulting from source monitoring failures, then it is of course
possible that this is a source monitoring failure induced largely by
the test itself, rather than by a lack of sensitivity on the behalf of
the individual. In other words, because the DRM lists are
constructed in such a way as to promote source monitoring failures
they may potentially mask individual differences in sensitivity.
There is one other possibility that might account for the lack of
a relationship between DRM errors and the endorsement of
misleading PEI – the self-generated nature of the errors. Recall
that in the studies that have found differences in DRM errors
between participants who do, and do not, suffer certain types of
memory error (of abduction by space aliens, and of past lives),
those latter errors may have been largely self-generated. Although
an initial suggestion may have been made to some of these
participants that they had experienced abductions or past lives, it is
likely that the details of those experiences were generated (or
fleshed out) by the individuals themselves. In any case, participants
in those studies were recruited on the basis that they had either
already ‘recovered’ memories of, or ‘believed’ that they had been
abducted by space aliens [13] or had already reported improbable
memories of past lives [7].
In contrast, those studies where the memory errors appear to be
unrelated to DRM errors are those in which participants receive
direct external suggestions about the occurrence of some event
(e.g., childhood events that did not occur, [15], [16]), or the errors
amounted to erroneous remember/know judgments about a
genuine event, rather than endorsement of an entirely new
suggested event [3]. In essence, therefore, our findings might
favour the two [33] rather than three [34] category model of
memory errors. Perhaps different varieties of naturally occurring
memory errors (e.g., DRM, alien abduction) do indeed share some
common underlying mechanism that is not shared by the
suggestion dependent memory errors.
This issue could potentially be addressed using neuropsycho-
logical methods to complement the behavioural data. The
literature using neuropsychological methods to unravel the
DRM effect is equivocal about whether different brain activity is
involved in true and false recognition [35–37]. More recently,
neuropsychological methods have also been used to examine brain
activity in a more standard misinformation paradigm [37–39].
The findings of this work suggest that there are important
differences in brain activity in the medial temporal lobe during the
encoding [37], [38] and retrieval [39] of original and misinfor-
mation that can predict subsequent susceptibility to misinforma-
tion. Although there have been separate neuropsychological (e.g.,
PET, fMRI) studies of the DRM effect and the misinformation
effect no study to date has directly compared the brain structures
False Memory ? False Memory
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and processes involved when one person does both kinds of task.
Such work could potentially shed light on the findings we report
here.
In summary, the literature on whether DRM errors are
diagnostic of other forms of memory error is inconclusive. In the
present study robust and normally distributed DRM effects and
robust and normally distributed misinformation effects were
obtained, yet the two measures were not related either in terms
of the raw number of errors or signal detection indices of sensitivity
or response bias. Thus, the jury is still out on the generalisability of
DRM errors as an index of susceptibility to different kinds of
memory errors.
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